(de)constructing The Political Agenda Of Control Over Pesticides In Brazil by Franco C.D.R. & Pelaez V.
(DE)CONSTRUCTING THE POLITICAL AGENDA OF CONTROL OVER 
PESTICIDES IN BRAZIL
CAROLINE DA ROCHA FRANCO1 
VICTOR PELAEZ2
Introduction
Since the turn of the century, Brazil’s pesticide imports have grown faster (760%) 
than anywhere else in the world, making it the world’s second largest market by 2008 
(COMTRADE, 2014). In 2013, domestic pesticide sales amounted to some US$ 11.5 
billion (SINDIVEG, 2014), second only to the USA, with estimated sales of US$ 14 
billion (USDA, 2014).
Brazil began to expand its pesticide consumption in the 1950s-70s when it moved to 
modernize its agriculture based on principles pushed by the Green Revolution, a techno-
logical approach that emphasized the intensive use of chemical (pesticides and fertilizers) 
and biological (breeder seeds) inputs and of heavy machinery. The federal government 
backed it with direct financial support, including tax exemptions for new factories in 
Brazil and new rural credit facilities to prop up pesticide consumption. At the time, 
pesticide demand and supply expanded under the auspices of an outdated Decree-Law 
(#21,114/1934) that registered them for sale with no reference at all to these chemicals’ 
adverse effects on human health and the environment.
Once those adverse effects began to become clearer, environmental groups mo-
bilized to question the imposition of that kind of production and to demand systematic 
controls over these inputs’ sale and use. Today’s pesticide law (Law 7,802/1989), now in 
force for over 25 years, was drafted in a context of intense pressure from interest groups 
with conflicting rationales: one pushing the intensive use of agricultural inputs to boost 
agribusiness yields, versus the preservation of human health and the environment by 
means of controlling that production model. The outcome of that debate was the current 
pesticide policy, which replaced the 1934 Decree-Law and a myriad of diffuse executive 
orders and took significant steps to make rules for assessing impacts on the environmental 
and the health of farmworkers and consumers. Far from settling conflicts that emerged 
during the attempt to draft a stable policy, however, the new Law unleashed another se-
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ries of disputes over its enabling decree and regulations. These disputes only intensified 
with the growing share in Brazil’s commodity exports of big agribusiness, whose agents 
have worked hard to replace the present pesticide registration system with a more flexible 
approach to controlling impacts on health and the environment.
This article aims to review the historical process of building and transforming the 
political agenda on controlling pesticide use. Our analytical reference uses the theme 
of agenda setting, based on John Kingdon’s (1995) Multiple Streams Model, in order to 
investigate how a given issue becomes relevant for a government at a specific historical 
moment.
In order to review the historical evolution of the policy agenda, vis-à-vis pesticide 
regulations, our research found its primary sources in official documents such as: bills of 
law, minutes of Congressional meetings and of the Special Commission set up to draft the 
federal pesticides bill, and opinions published on the websites of the National Congress and 
the Rio Grande do Sul State Legislative Assembly. We also used secondary sources such as 
news on the Brazilian political context while the law was being formulated, as well as the 
positions and declarations of organizations representing the pesticides industry and go-
vernmental agencies. Those sources are available in newspaper and magazine articles and 
in specialized books, in websites and in technical notes published by regulatory agencies.
The dynamics of multiple streams models
The public policy cycle described by Kingdon (1995) is made up of a set of auto-
nomous processes, including: setting an agenda, specifying alternatives amongst which 
choices are made, a final choice amongst available alternatives and implementation of 
the decision (CAPELLA, 2007). In his description of the multiple streams model, the 
author focuses on the first two stages – governmental agenda setting and the alternatives 
for policy formulation – in which he seeks to explain why some themes make it onto the 
public-policy agenda, becoming important to a government, and others do not.
To that end, he analyzes three dynamic streams: the problem stream, the policy 
stream and the political stream. The problem stream filters all the themes that draw the 
attention of authorities at a given moment. Kingdon considers problems to be social cons-
tructions, or interpretations of situations experienced and identified as relevant by players 
involved in public policies. In that sense, formulating a problem is itself a fundamental 
activity that can determine whether an issue will ever be put on a government’s agenda.
Even some situations that draw the attention of authorities may not end up on the 
discussion agenda. The process of building or formulating answers to possible problems 
emerges through the stream of alternatives and solutions (the policy stream) and limits 
the set of possible alternatives from which solutions are chosen. Kingdon uses the analogy 
of natural selection. He argues that as ideas are generated by a community of experts 
(policy communities) – whose analysis of a situation is not always unanimous – they go 
through a refining process. This involves the production of scientific articles, peer re-
view, exposure to empirical tests, etc. Ideas being discussed, like biological organisms in 
evolution, remain in what biologists term a “primeval soup.” They may rise to the surface 
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under certain favorable circumstances, for example a governmental crisis or handover. 
They do not float there, statically, but combine with other ideas, some of which survive 
while others are discarded. In this fermentation of ideas, those that display more technical 
feasibility, are affordable and represent shared values meet less resistance. This tends to 
amplify their acceptance in a process called “softening up” (KINGDON, 1995, p. 138).
In the political stream, three elements influence a government’s agenda. The first 
is what Kingdon calls the national mood, in which the perception of a favorable mood by 
participants in the decision-making process may lead certain issues to be promoted, while 
others are destroyed (Ibidem). The second element in the political stream is constituted 
by organized political forces, mainly pressure groups. The third factor affecting the agenda 
is turnover in the government itself, such as the replacement of individuals in strategic 
posts in public bodies, changes in the makeup of Congress or shifts in the jurisdiction 
where a given issue is discussed (Idem, p. 160-162).
Shifts in the political agenda, allowing new public policies to emerge, occur mainly 
on occasions that allow for the junction of the three policy streams: policy problems, 
solutions and dynamics. That convergence is a policy window for advocates of a cause 
to offer solutions in their own interest, or to draw attention to the special problems they 
perceive (Idem, p. 173).
Opening the pesticide policy window: leadership from the south
A policy window, through which pesticides could find their way onto a national 
agenda for the environment and human health, began to open under pressure from social 
and political mobilizations in southern Brazil, particularly in the State of Rio Grande do 
Sul (RS), after the Gaúcha Association to Protect the Natural Environment (Agapan) 
was founded in 1971. One of their most important mobilizations was in May 1982, in 
response to the pollution of the Guaíba River with organochlorine insecticides used on 
crops in the region.
That event galvanized several community organizations (the Gaúcha Women’s 
Democratic Association (ADFG); the RS Toxicology Studies Center; the Gaúcha 
Association to Protect the Natural Environment (Agapan); the RS Federation of 
Neighborhood Associations (FRACAB); the Justice and Human Rights Movement; 
the Society of Agronomists; the Society of Engineers; the Ecological Law Institute; the 
Balduino Rambo Foundation; the Association of Chemical Pharmacists; the Gaúcha 
Sociologists Association; the RS Teachers’ Center; the Gravataí Valley Nature Preser-
vation Association; the Institute of Architects of Brazil and the Architects’ Union, all 
of them under the leadership of Agapan. They met regularly under the auspices of the 
State Legislature’s Human Rights Commission, where they created a forum focused on 
this theme (FERRARI, 1985, p. 53).
That contamination of the Guaíba River was the disaster that generated a crisis, as 
defined by Kingdon (1995). Often problems need a “little push” to draw the attention of 
people and of the government. Thus, to make an item move from a less-visible arena onto 
the government’s agenda, something has to happen, including a real crisis that decision-
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-making authorities cannot ignore. Ferrari (1985, p. 53) listed the reasons identified by 
the organizations to highlight this particular environmental crisis:
... first of all, the fact that organochlorines are highly persistent che-
micals that accumulate and degrade slowly in the environment and 
whose ongoing consumption would further raise the rate of pollution 
of the Guaíba water; and secondly the fact that the Jacuí Basin, 
which supplies 35% of the Guaíba’s water, is located in the region 
with the State’s highest rate of organochlorine use. The Jacuí Basin 
covers 33% of the State, with 66% of its population, i.e., more than 
five million people.
The forum’s initial objectives were to: (a) ban the sale and use of organochlorine 
chemicals in the State; (b) demand that the State government’s Secretariat of Health 
and Environment carry out studies on the toxicological effects of organochlorines, since 
no consistent information was available; and (c) require Agronomic Prescriptions for 
their sale (ibidem).
This third demand was a recommendation by agronomists, who had debated the 
issue for years. In April 1978, they organized the 1st Course on Ground Rules for Agro-
nomic Prescriptions, organized by the Gaúcho Toxicological Studies Center. The purpose 
was that agronomists, as intermediaries between the industry and users, should go beyond 
the information provided by companies, since prescribing pesticides required ongoing 
studies on the technology, along with an analysis of the local and regional ecology and 
on toxicological concerns for humans, animals, plants and the environment (ALVES 
FILHO, 2002). The list of demands thus made agronomic prescriptions a priority for en-
vironmentalists, as a critical rationalization to reduce the intensive use of pesticides, in a 
way that helped soften up resistance to public-policy controls over this farming method.
The points defended at the Human Rights Commission were used to draft Bill 
#155/1982, which covered major issues raised by organized civil society, such as:
a) allowing the distribution and sale of imported pesticides only when 
their use is authorized in the country of origin;
b) require the product’s toxicological classification to be carried out 
and made public in a registry by the Secretariat of Health and the 
Environment;
c) grant civil society organizations the right to challenge product 
registrations;
d) require Agronomic Prescriptions for pesticide sales.
The drafting process of what became Law #7,747/82 in Rio Grande do Sul in-
fluenced other States as well, since members of the RS Assembly were members of the 
“Interstate Parliamentary Union,” which met once or twice a year. It had its own Com-
mission on the Environment, whose members took the initiative to their own States. 
That mobilization led to the passage of State pesticide laws in Paraná (Law #7,827/1983), 
Ambiente & Sociedade  n  São Paulo v. XIX, n. 3  n  p. 215-232  n jul.-set. 2016 
217(De)Constructing the political agenda of control over pesticides in Brazil
Santa Catarina (Law #6,452/1984), Minas Gerais (Law #4,002/1984), São Paulo (Law 
#4,002/84) and Espírito Santo (Law #3,706/84).
To oppose the legislation pioneered by Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil’s pesticide in-
dustry association, ANDEF, allied with the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, filed two suits 
(Representação de Inconstitucionalidade #1,153 and #1,150 ) in the Federal Supreme 
Court (STF) to have the State Law declared unconstitutional. ANDEF’s core argument 
was that States have no authority to legislate or control the production, sale and use of 
pesticides, which were under the federal government’s exclusive powers. The RS State 
Prosecutor’s Office took the opposite position and defended the constitutionality of the 
law, grounded in the States’ supplementary powers (FERRARI, 2013).
In May, 1985, the Supreme Court ruled the Rio Grande do Sul State Pesticide Law 
constitutional, but struck down several of its key provisions. The State could not register 
products nor set standards and criteria for their toxicological classification. It did, however, 
uphold its powers to condition pesticide sales to the issuing of agronomic prescriptions.
Drafting the federal pesticide law
The major variables for the historical setting in which the Federal Agrotoxins 
Law was drafted were the spread of State laws, a number of law suits and the growing 
worldwide movement on environmental and human-health agendas. Also crucial, at 
the time, were the end of the military dictatorship (1985) and the new Federal Cons-
titution (1988).
The Constitution of the Republic was issued after more than 20 years of military 
dictatorship, ruled by “Institutional Acts” that explicitly banned political demonstrations, 
participatory decision-making and any social construction of a political project for the 
country (SILVA, 2012, p.88-89). The context for constitutional reform was thus very 
favorable to an environmental protection agenda, which gained a chapter of its own for 
the first time in history.
Shortly after taking office as Minister of Agriculture in 1985, Pedro Simon (a 
member of the PMDB party, from Rio Grande do Sul) convened a Special Commission 
to draft a bill on pesticides, to replace Decree-Law #24,114/1934. His initiative came in 
response to social demands for more rigid control over pesticides, inspired by Rio Grande 
do Sul’s State Law #7,747/82.
The draft bill produced by that commission was sent to the Office of the President 
(via Exposição de Motivos #005) in January 1986. When a new Minister of Agriculture, 
Iris Resende, took office in February 1986, the draft bill was reviewed, supposedly to 
eliminate any unconstitutionalities. In June 1986 it was presented to the President’s 
office and then, until the publication of Decree #96,944 in 1988, creating the Program 
to Defend Ecosystems in the Legal Amazon (known as “Our Nature”), the draft pesticide 
bill sat on a shelf, unnoticed, in the office of the President’s Chief of Staff.
The Our Nature Program arose from struggles by rubber-tappers in the Amazon, 
to preserve their ways of life and defend the environment. It was also Brazil’s response 
to international outcry after the murder of the rubber-tapper environmentalist, Chico 
Ambiente & Sociedade  n  São Paulo v. XIX, n. 3  n  p. 215-232  n jul.-set. 2016  
218 Franco and Pelaez
Mendes. It had major impacts not only for the Amazon, but for environmental protection 
nationwide (RICHARD, 2013).
Environmental politics were ridden with conflict at the time. A year after Chi-
co Mendes won UNEP’s Global 500 prize in 1987, and the Swedish Right Livelihood 
Foundation’s award, he was murdered. That event had significant international reper-
cussions (SIMONS, 1988).
The Our Nature Program had nothing to say about legislation to control pesticides. 
The international context generated by the death of Chico Mendes, however, imposed 
on the Brazilian government the need to do something to protect the environment. That 
helped put the draft bill discussed in 1986 back on the political agenda as a national prio-
rity. Former President Sarney recognized Brazil’s credibility crisis over the environment:
In August 1988, a thousand square kilometers of forest were burned 
every day. International criticism and pressure on Brazil mounted and 
led the government to react. In 1988, Sarney launched the Program 
to Defend Ecosystems in the Legal Amazon, the so-called “Our 
Nature Program,” aimed at creating the conditions for the use and 
preservation of the environment and of renewable natural resources 
in the Legal Amazon. (SARNEY, 2011)
The draft bill was then fast-tracked by the government and appended to the Our 
Nature Program. In April 1989, the President’s Office sent it for the National Congress 
to deliberate on the text. Just like the Guaíba River pollution had been the “small push” 
it took to pass Rio Grande do Sul’s pesticide law, the murder of Chico Mendes and the 
launching of the Our Nature Program were key factors to get the draft bill, stuck in the 
Office of the Chief of Staff, to move onto the federal government’s agenda.
In less than three months, Bill # 1,924/1989 was approved by the lower house, 
the Chamber of Deputies, and then passed by the Senate in July 1989, with no amend-
ments. That same month, President José Sarney signed it into Federal Law #7,802/89 
and launched Brazil’s new pesticides policy.
Innovations in the pesticides law
The new Law #7,802/89, known as the “Agrotoxins Law,” defined its subject mat-
ter as “agrotoxins,” a concept used by the authors of the 1988 Constitution to refer to 
pesticides, in article 220, §4º. The term had first been coined by Adilson Paschoal (1979, 
p. 34-35), a professor of ecology at the University of São Paulo, as an alternative to the 
euphemism “defensivos” (crop protectors) widely adopted by the pesticide industry and 
much of the academic community.
The expression crop protector (defensivo agrícola) is an ecological 
utopia, since the products it describes cannot be viewed as instru-
ments of protection, but rather of destruction and disruption of the 
biosphere’s equilibrium. For lack of a better term, we suggest using 
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agrotoxin, in the general sense of including all chemicals used to fight 
pests and disease in agroecosystems.
The law set stricter rules to control pesticides, including a broader range of inputs. 
Previously, only toxics used for agriculture and household pest control were controlled, 
respectively, by Decree-Law #24,114/34 and Law #6,360/76. In article 2 of the new 
law, the scope now covers new products for toxicological and agronomic control, include 
pastureland, native and planted forests and other ecosystems such as water, industrial 
and urban environments (ANVISA, 2004).
Positive steps to protect human health and preserve the environment included the 
possibility to challenge or cancel a product’s registration at the request of civil society 
organizations, allowing greater democratic participation in the control of pesticides; 
prohibition of the registration of products for which Brazil has no methods to deactivate 
the action of components that are toxic for humans or the environment; prohibition of 
the registration of new pesticides whose toxic action is not equal to or less than existing 
products used for the same purpose; mandatory registration of manufacturers, dealers 
and appliers of such products by municipal or State authorities, in order better to trace 
liability for violations involving pesticides; new standards for pesticide packaging, labeling 
and instructions; assignment of legal liability for any damage caused by pesticides; and the 
obligation, previously restricted to certain States with their own laws, to sell pesticides 
only with the use of agronomic prescriptions.
The law set up a tripartite structure to regulate pesticides, with specific powers for 
the federal bodies with authority over health, the environment and agriculture. Pesticides 
may only be registered if authorized by each of the three. The Ministry of Agriculture and 
Livestock (Mapa) is responsible for evaluating each product’s agronomic effectiveness 
and need. The Ministry of Health (MS) and its National Health Surveillance Agency 
(Anvisa) verify toxicological testing of impacts on human health; and the Ministry of the 
Environment (MMA), through its Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable 
Natural Resources (IBAMA), evaluates studies on environmental impacts.
In addition to the controls shared among those three ministries, the law requires 
a danger assessment by prohibiting the registration of pesticides that are carcinogenic, 
teratogenic, mutagenic or hormone disruptors. That danger is analyzed as part of the 
products’ toxicological assessment, which uses laboratorial analyses as evidence of danger. 
If proven, the use of a pesticide is restricted or forbidden (SILVA, 2013, p. 43-44).
The approval of that requirement, back in 1989, put Brazilian law in the vanguard, 
since similar criteria were only adopted by the European Union through its Regulation 
(EC) No 1107/2009, which came into effect in June 2011. The criteria used to register 
pesticides in the US, for example, is based on a preliminary danger analysis. If there is 
a potential for damage, they seek to control it by identifying a safe dose, based on the 
analysis and management of the risk of using a dangerous chemical, as explained by Pelaez, 
Silva e Borges (2013, p. 654):
Risk assessment assumes that, even when a chemical presents an 
intrinsic danger, it can be managed, i.e. considered safe, by stipulating 
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a means of application, a maximum dosage to be allowed for use and 
limits on what may be ingested, by setting an acceptable daily intake 
and maximum residue limits. That analysis is legitimized by weighing 
the benefits achieved from using the product to protect crops against 
undesirable organisms. That analysis allows the use of many pesticides 
with intrinsically unacceptable traits, considering their danger, to be 
authorized through risk “management.”
Limits on the action of regulatory agencies
The law did bring greater rigor to the process of registration, in terms of possible 
harm caused by pesticides to the environment and human health. Yet other problems 
remained. The term of registration is indefinite, although authorities may review the 
situation whenever there are indications of harmful effects to health or the environment, 
or loss of agronomic efficacy (art. 5, §1). In such cases, the burden of proof lies on the 
regulatory agency, which must be able to demonstrate that the assessment criteria used 
to grant the original registration either were mistaken or have become outdated with new 
scientific evidence on a particular active ingredient. If such suspicions are confirmed, the 
review process may restrict or even cancel the use or sale of the product.
To carry out the tripartite regulations involving pesticides, only the health authority 
has a regulatory agency as the responsible public body. Agricultural and environmental 
aspects of regulation are carried out by the respective ministries. That means, in theory, 
that Anvisa is the only independent regulatory body, as a special administrative entity 
(autarquia) with autonomy from the ministry to which it is legally bound. For pesticide 
regulation, however, there is no practical difference between Anvisa’s regulatory activi-
ties, as a regulatory agency, and those carried out by the Ministries of the Environment or 
of Agriculture and Livestock, subordinated to the President of the Republic, all subject 
to direct links between the federal government’s political and administrative spheres.
None of the three regulatory agencies’ activities are exempt from the influence 
of elected politicians, since even Anvisa’s formal legal autonomy can be problematic. 
Administrators, for example, use their political and financial authority to rewrite remits 
and jurisdictions, cut back budgets or name board members. Anvisa has also been sub-
jected to specific acts by politicians who represent interest groups in the regulated sector 
(PELAEZ, SILVA and BORGES, 2013, p. 650).
Moreover, major asymmetries in the amount of information available to authorities 
and to regulated companies restrict the technical knowhow at Anvisa, the Mapa and 
Ibama. Regulators’ assessments and controls all rely on information provided by applicants, 
including data on agronomic performance and human and environmental toxicity, from 
studies sponsored by the chemical manufacturers themselves. In addition to the number 
of tests to be assessed, there are also many applications for new registrations, including 
the assessment of new active ingredients, in a variety of formulations and of packaging. 
Under such conditions, public regulatory agencies cannot economically afford to replicate 
studies presented by companies (Idem, p. 654). All they can do, therefore, is review data 
provided by the interested parties. That review is also limited by the small staff responsible 
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for this task. Pelaez, Silva and Borges (2013, p.653) highlighted the scarcity of human 
resources available to assess pesticides in Brazil, compared to those doing the same work 
at the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
The EPA also has a significant staff of employees working specifically 
on pesticide regulation. There are some 850 people employed by the 
Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP) who are responsible for pestici-
de assessments and registration. The OPP also has four consulting 
committees, made up of ad hoc experts. (…) In contrast to the large 
staff at the EPA, Brazil’s three regulatory agencies have some 50 
employees to carry out the same activities for pesticide assessments 
and registration.
This dearth of regulatory resources means a growing backlog of new, unanswered 
applications for registration. In June 2014, 1,500 applications were awaiting analysis 
(ANVISA, 2014). That provokes pressure from the regulated sector, in institutional 
discussion arenas or through lobbies on executive and legislative authorities, to speed up 
the regulatory process. The most complex assessments, of impacts on the environment 
and human health, take longer and are the main targets of complaints by the regulated 
sector. Proposals now on the table include the creation of a single regulatory agency, as we 
see in a letter to the Mapa’s sectoral chamber for agricultural inputs, signed jointly by the 
Brazilian Association of Generic Protectants (Aenda), the National Union of Protectant 
Companies (Sindag) and the National Plant Protection Association (ANDEF):
The advent of Law 7,802/89 allowed Brazil to become a leader in 
the production of food, fibers and renewable energy. (…) We believe 
that the creation of a national agency for the registration of plant-
-protection products, linked to the MAPA, with the transfer of expert 
personnel from the Anvisa, Ibama and MAPA, could expedite the 
registration process, significantly shortening the time spent between 
the application for and granting of a registration. Moreover, regula-
tory norms, which are so outdated in the present system, would be 
published faster since there would be no need for the approval of three 
ministers. (our underline) (AENDA, SINDAG and ANDEF, 2005).
Interest groups working to redefine the problem
Demands to expedite the registration process reveal conflicts among the associations 
representing the interests of pesticide manufacturers, the two most important of which 
are the ANDEF, representing the largest pesticide corporations, and Aenda, representing 
smaller companies that produce and import off-patent products.
ANDEF (2008) works to have the regulatory agencies prioritize the registration 
of new active ingredients, to ensure a return to their investments in research and deve-
lopment:
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We are concerned by the small number of modern plant-protection 
products, with new active ingredients, available to Brazilian farmers. 
(…) Plant-protection registration agencies must prioritize analyses 
of applications to register new active ingredients. Any technical diffi-
culties must be solved as quickly as possible, with collaboration from 
manufacturers and from researchers at the various official agencies.
AENDA (2013), on the other hand, works to hasten the assessment of “generic” 
products, arguing that this makes the pesticide market less concentrated and more compe-
titive. It defends the need to remove “bureaucracies” in pesticide registration, making these 
inputs less expensive for farmers and helping increase the nation’s agricultural production.
The government must understand that this is a highly oligopolized 
market with a bias towards even more concentration, as witnessed in 
moves by big chemical corporations to merge and voraciously acquire 
seed companies, fighting for shares of the plant-protection market 
through biotechnology. (…) That scenario demands an industrial 
policy prioritizing incentives to competition with a strategy to stimu-
late local production and the preservation of generic manufacturers.
The National Confederation of Agriculture (CNA) often takes Aenda’s side, un-
derlining the need to prioritize the registration of “generic” pesticides to reduce the price 
of food. The then CNA’s chairwoman (senator Kátia Abreu) even nominally accused 
Anvisa employees of generating a market reserve for ANDEF:
These three persons work at Anvisa (…) three sinister individuals who 
for ten years have kept generic protectants from being registered in 
this country. (…) At Ibama, I confess that I observe much more of an 
ideological issue than any corruption, protection, lobbying or market 
reserve. I sincerely see a lot of ideology there. But as for these three 
citizens, and I now challenge them to come here, with the companies 
trying to register products, for a solid debate right here. The three of 
them protect ANDEF. ANDEF is the powerful National Association 
of Multinationals responsible for four and a half billion in yearly sales 
in this country. (ANVISA, 2007, p.2).
Comparing the positions of these organizations, ANDEF since 2000 has taken a 
different approach than it did in the 1970s and 1980s. Over the years it has taken on 
some environmentalist rhetoric, especially regarding the need for food quality and safety. 
It began defending a strict Brazilian pesticide policy, criticizing demands for more flexible 
procedures for the registration of off-patent inputs. In one of its statements on simplifying 
the registration of equivalent pesticides, its executive president said (ANDEF, 2007):
In response to the possibility of seeing Brazil throw out its enhanced 
legislation, built upon the pillars of experience and the requirements 
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of domestic and overseas markets, and just open the doors of its 
agriculture to some supposedly economic benefit, ANDEF and its 
members have confidence in the seriousness of our authorities’ careful 
conduct in the approval of generic products. The push for swiftness 
cannot ignore the judicious assessment that must guide procedures, 
including the toxicological approval of plant-protection products, as 
a way to guarantee the quality of the chemicals and the quality of the 
food supplied to the market.
Reworking the pesticide regulation agenda
In this scenario of ongoing challenges to the powers of the regulatory agencies, 
especially Anvisa and Ibama, the 25 years since the Agrotoxins Law came into force seem 
to have intensified the interest of private groups in speeding up their access to the world’s 
second largest pesticide market. In the National Congress, we identified more than 35 
bills of law to amend the Agrotoxins Law and its regulations. Many propose similar chan-
ges, such as: concentrating regulation in a single official body, eliminating the tripartite 
division between MAPA, Anvisa and Ibama; providing public-sector support to the use 
of pesticides, particularly through tax breaks; reducing the number of studies required 
in registration applications, to speed up the assessment process and get the product on 
the market sooner; blocking regulators’ restrictions on the use of economically profitable 
pesticides; and changing the legal name of pesticides to “agricultural protectants” (defen-
sivos) or agrochemicals, instead of the present term “agrotoxin” (agrotóxico).i
Many of the bills break with the rationale of protecting health and the environment, 
which prevails in the law now in force. Considering the past 40 years of pesticide policies 
in Brazil, and all the victories of the environmentalist movement to protect health and 
the environment, today’s situation unveils a period of setbacks for the environmental 
protection policy agenda.
As observed by Leuzinger (2013), the 1960s, 1980s and 1990s were marked by the 
issuance of lawsii that lay the grounds for the fundamental right to a balanced environment, 
as promised by the 1988 Federal Constitution. Since 2005, however, a counter-movement 
has emerged, to deconstruct Environmental Law. Landmarks include changes to the Bio-
safety Law in 2006, which shifted decision-making powers on the release of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) from Anvisa and Ibama to the National Technical Biosafety 
Commission (CTNBio); the weakening of controls over the planting of GMOs in buffer 
zones around Conservation Units, in 2006 and 2010, formerly assured by the law that 
created the National System of Conservation Units (SNUC); and – perhaps most impor-
tantly – the replacement of the 1965 Forest Code with Law #1,251/2012, which granted 
a broad amnesty to acts of deforestation throughout the country (LEUZINGER, 2013).
This weakening of environmental laws has the prominent support of the Parlia-
mentary Front to Support Agriculture (the so-called “Ruralist Caucus”) in the National 
Congress, which has 158 members who make up 31% of the Chamber of Deputies and 
22% of the Senate, in the 2011-14 legislature (DIAP, 2011). The Front finds support for 
its work in economic performance indicators showing that agribusiness was responsible for 
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41% of Brazil’s exports in 2013 (BRASIL, 2014). With figures like that, players working 
to lower environmental barriers to the expansion of agriculture have expanded their 
legitimacy and political power, both to redefine the problem and to choose the solutions 
most favorable to their own interests.
Final considerations
This article has tried to tell the history of how the federal pesticide law was cons-
tructed and how it may be deconstructed, using the multiple stream approach. Through 
the problem stream, we see the importance of crises that provoked discussions and put 
pesticides on governmental agendas to defend health and the environment. In Rio Grande 
do Sul, it was an environmental crisis that polluted the Guaíba River. For the federal go-
vernment, it was an international crisis linked to the murder of an environmental leader. 
Such crises would have had no political repercussion without the support of organized 
civil society, through environmental defense groups and agronomists’ associations. Risk 
indicators and pollution data produced by those communities of lay people and experts 
were also key in sustaining decisions made during both the policy and the politics streams.
Both crises can be interpreted as windows of opportunity, which only became 
“opportune” in the wake of political mobilizations by organized interest groups. Civil 
society’s mobilization led to the construction of advanced legislation to protect health and 
the environment, but seems to have lost strength to pesticide industry associations and 
part of the agriculture sector. A weaker environmental agenda to benefit the country’s 
short-term economic performance may indicate a major shift towards setbacks in the 
legal framework regulating pesticide production, sale and use in Brazil. This political 
environment, shored up by the economic performance of agribusiness and the weight of 
political forces organized in Congress (the policy stream), has led to the environmental 
agenda being softened up, or literally forgotten.
Times of economic recession and changes in government, like we are experien-
cing now, point to crises even more likely to dislodge environmental protection from the 
government’s agenda. Civil society’s greatest challenge now, therefore, is to re-interpret 
environmental protection, not as a hindrance to economic development, but as a solution 
for its long-term sustainability.
Notes
i The bills proposing major changes in the Chamber of Deputies are: PL 3125/2000, PL 6189/2005, PL 4166/2012 and 
INC 27007/2012. In the Senate, they are: PL 6299/2002 and PL 209/2013.
ii Laws from that period include the 1965 Forest Code, the 1967 Wildlife Protection Law, the 1981 National Environmental 
Policy; the 1997 National Water Resources Policy, the 1998 Environmental Crimes Law and the 2000 National System 
of Conservation Units.
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Summary: This article provides a history of the creation of Brazil’s federal law governing 
pesticide production, commerce and use. It begins with initiatives by environmental mo-
vements that led States to adopt pesticide control laws, thus helping put the issue on the 
federal agenda. It discusses major innovations and limitations to the law’s enforcement 
and identifies the main attempts to deconstruct it, through bills aimed at suppressing 
the powers of public authorities to reduce adverse effects of pesticides on human health 
and the environment.
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Resumo: Este artigo apresenta um retrospecto histórico da criação da lei federal de controle 
da produção, do comércio e do uso de agrotóxicos no Brasil. Resgata a iniciativa dos movi-
mentos ambientalistas que levaram à criação de leis estaduais de controle dos agrotóxicos. 
Essas leis  contribuíram para que a agenda de controle dos agrotóxicos fosse pautada em 
nível federal. Apresenta as principais inovações e limitações de implementação da lei. E 
identifica as principais tentativas de descontrução da mesma, por meio de projetos de lei 
que visam inibir as competências dos órgãos públicos, vinculados à redução dos efeitos 
adversos dos agrotóxicos à saúde e ao meio ambiente.
Palavras-chave: agrotóxicos, agenda, regulação, Brasil
Resumen: Este artículo presenta un breve histórico de la ley federal de control de pro-
ducción, comercio y uso de pesticidas en Brasil. Rescata la iniciativa de los movimientos 
ambientalistas que llevaron a la creación de leyes estaduales de control de los pesticidas. 
Esas leyes contribuyeron para que la agenda del control de pesticidas fuese adoptada en 
nivel federal. Además, el texto identifica las principales tentativas de desconstrucción de 
la ley federal por medio de proyectos de ley que intentan inhibir las competencias de las 
agencias públicas responsables por la reducción de los efectos adversos de los pesticidas en 
la salud humana y el medioambiente.
Palavras clave: pesticidas; agenda; regulación; Brasil.
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